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Abstract It has been argued that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is the
best hunting ground for genuine examples of metaphysical indeterminacy. Ap-
proaches to metaphysical indeterminacy can be divided into two families:
meta-level and object-level accounts. It has been shown (Darby, 2010; Skow,
2010) that the most popular version of the meta-level accounts, namely the
metaphysical supervaluationism proposed by Barnes and Williams (2011), fails
to deal with quantum indeterminacy. Such a fact has been taken by many as
a challenge to adapt supervaluationism to quantum cases. In this paper, I will
focus on the very last of these attempts, i.e. the situation semantics account
proposed by Darby and Pickup (2019). After having shown where quantum
indeterminacy arises and having surveyed the assumptions endorsed by the
participants of the debate, I turn to Darby and Pickup’s proposal. I argue
that, despite the machinery introduced, their account still fails to account for
quantum indeterminacy. After considering some possible counterarguments, I
suggest in the conclusion that one can plausibly extend the argument to those
meta-level approaches that treat quantum indeterminacy as worldly indeci-
sion.
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1 Introduction
Metaphysical indeterminacy (henceforth ‘MI’) is the idea that indeterminacy
is a feature of the world itself, rather than a feature imputable to the words we
use (Fine, 1975) or to our knowledge (Williamson, 1994). MI has often been
regarded as a priori incoherent. Such an attitude has been encouraged by three
main facts. First, many thought that MI necessarily allows the possibility
of indeterminate identities. Given the strength of Evan’s (1978) argument
against such a position, the majority of philosophers have concluded that MI
is impossible. Second, many’s attitudes on MI were influenced by authoritative
philosophers like Russell (1923) and Lewis (1986), who explicitly banned MI as
conceptually contradictory or, if coherent, blatantly impossible. Third, there
were no positive reasons for thinking that MI was conceivable in the first place.
Indeed, precise and convincing accounts of MI were nowhere to be found,
leading many to the conclusion that MI is inconceivable.
The attitude toward the possibility of MI now seems to be more relaxed than
before, especially because logically clear accounts of MI have been put forward
in the literature. Moreover, many authors have argued that these accounts help
make sense of different phenomena.1
As a matter of fact, many think that the most compelling reason for taking MI
seriously is that some interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics,
plus some extra assumptions, seem to suggest a genuine case of it. Even if the
first examples of quantum MI proposed2 are no longer seen as genuine, that
the properties of quantum objects are metaphysically indeterminate is still a
live option (Bokulich, 2014; Wolff, 2015; Calosi and Wilson, 2018).
Following Wilson (2013), one may divide the accounts of MI available in the
literature into two broad categories:3
– Meta-level accounts: usually, these approaches consider MI as worldly
‘indecision’ between different possible, mutually incompatible, precise states
of affairs. In other terms, p is metaphysically indeterminate iff (i) there are
at least two possible descriptions of a state of affairs involving p, i.e. p and
¬p, and (ii) these possible descriptions that do not contain in themselves
any semantic nor epistemic indeterminacy fail in both determinately rep-
resenting and misrepresenting the actual world. The details vary slightly
across models, but the general idea remains the same: a state of affairs
is metaphysically indeterminate when the world itself is unsettled between
1 Future (Barnes and Cameron, 2009) and fictional (Darby, Pickup, and Robson, 2017)
states of affairs are examples among others.
2 Notably the one proposed by Lowe (1994) as a counterexample of Evans’ argument. The
contemporary general agreement is that quantum mechanics does not conclusively support
indeterminate identity. For a survey on identity in quantum mechanics see French and Krause
(2006).
3 What follows is a rough and ready description of the main intuition that most of these
approaches to MI try to capture rather than an exhaustive presentation of every view. An
important exception is the view presented in Torza (2017). Such a view is a meta-level
account, even though it does not involve any worldly indecision; rather, the indeterminacy
is considered as due to the incompleteness of the ersatz world that represents reality.
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(at least) two possible determinate states. Examples of meta-level accounts
can be found in Akiba (2004), Barnes and Williams (2011) and Darby et al.
(2017).
– Object-level accounts: this family of accounts claims that there are three
possible states of affairs: the state that p, that ¬p and the state that it is
indeterminate whether p. MI is thus considered as a third state of affairs
that cannot be reduced nor be understood in terms of the two definite states
p and ¬p. Arguably, Tye (1990) is one of the progenitors of this approach to
MI, albeit his account seems not so popular anymore for different reasons.4
Other object-level accounts of MI can be found in Smith and Rosen (2004)
and Wilson (2013).
The contemporary research in MI seems to be oriented toward the former
family of accounts rather than the latter.5 In what follows, I focus on meta-
level treatments of indeterminacy and how they deal with examples taken from
non-relativistic quantum mechanics. In particular, I focus on the account re-
cently developed in Darby, Pickup, and Robson (2017) and Darby and Pickup
(2019). I provide background on where and under what assumptions quantum
indeterminacy is supposed to arise in section 2, while section 3 is devoted to
a presentation of Darby and Pickup’s account.6 Then, I argue in section 4
that this way of modelling metaphysical indeterminacy fails to account for
quantum phenomena, even granting all the assumptions requested by Darby
and Pickup’s view. After considering possible replies to the argument here pre-
sented (section 5), I draw what I take to be the moral of all of this, namely, that
quantum superposition cannot be understood as worldly indecision between
definite states of affairs (section 6).
2 Where Quantum Indeterminacy Lies
That quantum mechanics offers a genuine example of MI is debatable. Indeed,
such a claim relies on five main assumptions which are, by themselves, highly
controversial. In this section, I briefly discuss them in turns.
First, the relevant literature concerning quantum MI assumes as a background
an ‘orthodox’ interpretation of quantum mechanics.7 It must be acknowledged
4 e.g. the open rejection of classical logic and the (alleged) difficulty of overcoming Evans’
argument against indeterminate identity.
5 Such a fact may be surprising if one agrees with Wilson (2013) that meta-level accounts
somehow rely on the very same intuition that guided the critics of MI, i.e. that MI is not a
particular state of affairs, and that it does not make sense if not understood as unsettledness
between determinate states of affairs.
6 Readers already familiar with quantum indeterminacy and Darby and Pickup’s account
may safely skip these two sections.
7 It is not completely clear what they mean by ‘orthodox’ interpretation. A more accurate
description would be that they try out ‘interpretation-neutral discussions of the ontology of
QM’ (Wallace, 2019, p.3). A charitable way of interpreting their claim is that of reading ‘or-
thodox’ interpretation as ‘textbook quantum mechanics’, i.e. the currently taught quantum
mechanics based on the Dirac-von Neumann formulation of the theory.
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that some of the main players of the debate have argued that MI also arises
in other interpretations8 as well; still, no complete and satisfying investigation
in this sense has been put forward yet. Since orthodox quantum mechanics is
seen as an instrumental view, the second assumption held is that being realist
or antirealist is a stance one assumes toward a theory, rather than something
embedded in the theory itself (following McMullin (1984)).
The third assumption is that Hermitian operators correspond to properties
instantiated by quantum systems;9 in particular, the relation between the
properties instantiated and their mathematical description is captured by the
‘Eigenstate-Eigenvalue link’ (EEL):10
(EEL) A quantum system has a definite value v for an observable O iff it is in an
eigenstate of Ô having eigenvalue v.
This principle bridges the mathematical and the metaphysical descriptions.
Under the assumption that the properties of a system (i.e. its observables) are
modelled in quantum formalism by Hermitian operators, (EEL) gives us the
sufficient and necessary conditions under which we can claim that a quantum
system instantiates some properties: if a property O is represented by a Her-
mitian operator Ô, the system instantiates that property if and only if its state
is an eigenstate of Ô.
There are many cases in which a system fails to be in an eigenstate of some
operator. Let us consider spin- 12 along different directions. Given some proper-
ties of the mathematical vector space in which spin properties are represented,
if a system is in a definite state of, say, spin up along the x-axis (|↑〉x), it is
necessarily in a superposed state of spin along the z-axis:
|ψ〉 = |↑〉x =
1√
2
(|↑〉z + |↓〉z) (1)
Since 1√
2
(|↑〉z + |↓〉z) is not an eigenvector of the operator σz (i.e. the operator
correspondent to the property ‘having spin along the z-axis’), when the system
is in |ψ〉, it does not have a definite value of spin along the z-axis. Friends of
quantum indeterminacy claim that when a system is in a state like |ψ〉, or
more generally, in a state that is not an eigenvector of some Hermitian opera-
tor, the system indeterminately instantiates the property that corresponds to
that operator. These kind of states are (allegedly) responsible for the arise of
quantum indeterminacy: when a quantum system is in one of these states, the
instantiation of one of its properties might be indeterminate.
The fourth assumption is that such indeterminacy is metaphysical rather than
semantic or epistemic. It is not semantic because equations are sharp and
8 In particular in GRW (Calosi and Wilson, 2018), Relational QM (Calosi and Mariani,
2020) and Many Worlds interpretation (Wilson, 2020).
9 This assumption has been contested, for example, in Daumer, Dürr, Goldstein, and
Zangh̀ı (1996); as a matter of fact, this assumption excludes MI from some interpretations
that explicitly reject it.
10 Or some of its variants, as it is discussed in Lewis (2016, Ch. 4).
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precise, and none of the imprecision connected with the ambiguities of nat-
ural languages is involved.11 It is not epistemic because some mathematical
theorems12 show formally that if you try to cheat, so to speak, by assigning
a definite value to all the properties, you contradict the empirically tested
predictions of quantum mechanics. The general conclusion is then that such
indeterminacy must be metaphysical.
Note finally that (EEL) per se is not enough for claiming that the system in-
determinately instantiates some properties. As Glick (2017) argues, one may
take the (EEL) as saying that when the state of a system is not an eigenvector
of an operator, it lacks the corresponding property altogether. Then, the fifth
assumption taken by the participants of the debate is what I dub ‘Property
Nonetheless’ (PN):
(PN) A quantum system always instantiates its (possible) observables (i.e. those
properties that can be measured and represented mathematically through
a Hermitian operator).13
This principle should guarantee that a system always instantiates its prop-
erties, making room for the possibility of indeterminacy. Indeed, (PN) and
(EEL) jointly implies that when the system is not in an eigenstate of one of
its observables, it does not possess a definite value for the corresponding prop-
erties. The fact that these values are not definite allows us to interpret it as if
the system indeterminately instantiates the property mentioned above.
Most of the assumptions above are controversial. The (EEL) has been strongly
criticized in different interpretations of quantum mechanics (Wallace, 2019; Al-
bert and Loewer, 1996); the claim that indeterminacy is not semantic nor epis-
temic might be resisted (either assuming an empiricist stance toward science or
accepting some ψ-epistemic interpretation of quantum mechanics). Insofar as,
in general, issues on quantum mechanics tend to be highly controversial, such
a list could continue forever. Since these assumptions are necessary for arguing
that quantum mechanics leaves open the possibility of MI, reasonably, they
are also endorsed by Darby and Pickup. So far as the paper aims at showing
that Darby and Pickup’s account fails to account for quantum indeterminacy I
uncritically endorse, for the sake of argument, the assumptions above in what
follows.
11 Some might be tempted to point out that some authors, most notably Reichenbach,
suggested that quantum mechanics is semantically indeterminate, in some sense or another.
Although I would agree with that, my reply is that such indeterminacy is not only semantic,
i.e. a specification of the terms used do not wash away, so to speak, the indeterminacy. That
(alleged) semantic indeterminacy in quantum mechanics reflects a more fundamental kind of
indeterminacy, one might be tempted to call it ‘metaphysical’, is acknowledged for instance
by Reichenbach (1975, p. 94) himself : “The deficiencies [i.e. that some propositions have
an indeterminate truth-value] must rather be regarded as the linguistic expression of the
structure of the atomic world, which thus is recognized as intrinsically different from the
macro-world, and likewise from the atomic world which classical physics had imagined.”
12 The most known formal results are those of: Gleason (1957); Kochen and Specker (1967);
Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (2012).
13 Note that the principle does not require that the properties of quantum systems are
definite at all the times.
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Having considered the assumptions needed in order to claim that quantum
mechanics offers a genuine example of MI, we now turn to how meta-level
approaches deal with quantum MI.
3 Meta-Level Accounts of Quantum Indeterminacy
2 Barnes and Williams (2011) proposed a supervaluationist account of MI.
According to them, when there is MI, there are at least two ersatz possible
worlds (that do not contain any semantic or epistemic indeterminacy in them-
selves) such that they both fail to represent reality correctly. However, these
possible worlds do not determinately misrepresent reality either. So, if it is
metaphysically indeterminate if p, then there is a possible world in which p
obtains and a possible world in which ¬p obtains, but it is in principle14 im-
possible to say which of these represent the concrete actual world. It has been
argued that their proposal fails to account for the indeterminacy that arises in
quantum mechanics: as Darby (2010) and Skow (2010) independently showed,
the Kochen-Specker theorem implies that there is at least one case in which it
is impossible to assign simultaneously (in a context-independent way) a defi-
nite value to all the properties of a quantum system. In Barnes and Williams’
account, the ersatz possible worlds are entirely defined and determinate; that
is, in every possible world, all the properties of every system always have a def-
inite value. Since the Kochen-Specker theorem shows that there is at least one
quantum system such that it is impossible to assign definite values to all its
properties, no possible worlds (of the kind employed in Barnes and Williams’
proposal) may be used to account for the indeterminacy of this quantum sys-
tem. Since there is at least a quantum system whose indeterminacy cannot be
accounted for using Barnes and Williams’ view, their account of MI is not apt
for explaining quantum indeterminacy in general.
The failure of Barnes and Williams’ account has been taken by many as a
challenge to develop a supervaluationist treatment of MI able to deal with
quantum cases.15 In what follows, I focus only on the most recent attempt
to develop a supervaluationist account of MI, namely the view proposed by
Darby and Pickup (2017; 2019).
The account proposed by Darby and Pickup consists of using a situation se-
mantics instead of the machinery of possible worlds. The core idea of situations
semantic is that the truth-value of a proposition16 has to be assessed relative
to a situation; where situations are parts of our concrete actual world, i.e.
14 That is, it is not a matter of knowledge. One may doubt, following the argument pro-
posed by Akiba (2015), that the account presented is not metaphysical, but semantic or
epistemic at best. Even if the same argument can be applied to the Darby and Pickup
account, I will not belabour this point in what follows.
15 See for example: Torza (2017); Mariani, Michels, and Torrengo, (manuscript presented
at the 4th Annual Conference of the Society for the Metaphysics of Science).
16 Darby and Pickup explicitly use ‘propositions’ instead of the more neutral ‘sentences.’
for the sake of argument, I also use ‘propositions’ in what follows.
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situations are non-representational concrete truth-makers. In the situation se-
mantics framework, propositions are not true or false simpliciter ; rather, their
truth-value is relative to the situation at which they are evaluated.17 Hence,
truth (and falsehood) simpliciter is replaced with ‘truth (falsehood) at a sit-
uation.’
Insofar as situations are intrinsically partial, they do not tell everything about
a certain state of affairs. In those situations that lack an aspect of reality,
the proposition expressing that part is taken by Darby and Pickup as lack-
ing a truth-value.18 An example will illustrate how situation semantics works.
Take a statement like ‘Alice is playing with her dog’. Such a proposition is
true if Alice is playing with her dog in the relevant situation and it is false
if she is jogging (or doing something different than playing with her dog) in
the relevant situation. In those situations in which there is no Alice, like in
the situation in which there is a ski race on a mountain distant from Alice,
the proposition ‘Alice is playing with her dog’ lacks a truth-value. Following
Barnes and Williams, Darby and Pickup try to model indeterminacy as a mat-
ter of truth-values in situations which are candidates for representing actuality.
The criteria of ‘candidates for representing actuality’ employed seems to be
the following: a situation is a candidate for representing actuality if it does
not determinately misrepresent19 the actual world. In the previous example, if
Alice is playing with her dog in the actual world, then any situation in which
the proposition ‘Alice is playing with her dog’ is true is a candidate for repre-
senting actuality; all the situations that determinately misrepresent the actual
world, i.e. those in which Alice is doing something else, are not candidates for
representing actuality. Given the fact that they accept that propositions can
17 Darby and Pickup describe situations as parts of possible worlds. Since their account is
explicitly a modification of the one proposed by Barnes and Williams, one may think that
situations are ersatz, as Barnes and Williams’ possible worlds are. In previous drafts of the
paper, I assumed such an interpretation of Darby and Pickup’s account. As an anonymous
referee makes me notice, though, it is more charitable to assume that Darby and Pickup’s
situations are parts of the concrete world.
18 Insofar as they do not offer a precise logic of their situation semantics, it is not entirely
clear how to model it. One possibility is that of building a semantics with a partial evaluation
function; another is that of introducing a third truth value. A final possibility is that of
following Levesque’s (1984) account, according to which it is not possible to assign a truth
value (in certain situations) to some propositions. The last possibility seems to be closest to
what Darby and Pickup’s have in mind. Alas, such a semantics is complicated and baroque
already at first-order. Even if there are reasons to think that the logic needed by Darby and
Pickup account is much more complex, if feasible at all, than what the authors explicitly
show, I will not press this point further.
19 They do not explain what ‘determinately misrepresenting’ means despite the prima facie
ambiguity of the term. I take its meaning to be the following: given a proposition p that
determinately true in the actual world, all the situations that make true a proposition that, if
conjoined with p, form a logical contradiction, determinately misrepresent the actual world.
For example, suppose that in the actual world Alice is playing with her dog, so that ‘Alice is
playing with her dog’ is true. All the situations that verify a proposition that, together with
‘Alice is playing with her dog’, entails a contradiction, determinately misrepresent the reality.
Note that since situations are concrete, it is inappropriate to say that they ‘misrepresent’
the actual world, because they are supposed to be parts of it. Nonetheless, I adopt in what
follows Darby and Pickup’s explicit terminology.
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lack a truth-value at a situation, also situations in which there is no Alice will
be candidates for representing actuality; obviously, this is true only if these
situations do not misrepresent the actual world in other regards. For example,
if in the actual world, while Alice is playing with her dog, there is a ski race
on some distant mountain, then both the situation with Alice playing and the
situation in which there is a ski race going on are candidates for reality.
Using the machinery of situation semantics, they propose to model MI as a
genuine disagreement between those situations that are candidates for repre-
senting actuality. When a state of affairs is determinate, the relevant situations,
i.e. those that are candidates for representing actuality that describe such a
state of affairs, never disagree. In the previous example, for instance, the sit-
uation with Alice playing with her dog in some places does not contradict the
situation with a ski race going on in some distant mountain. However, they
claim that, if there is MI, then we have different situations that disagree on
what reality is like, despite the fact that all of them are candidates for repre-
senting actuality.20 To capture such a disagreement, they propose the following
criteria:
Determinacy A proposition p is determinate iff it is true in some
situation which is a candidate for representing reality and false in no
such situation.
Indeterminacy A proposition p is indeterminate iff it is true in some
situation which is a candidate for representing reality and false in some
other such situation. (Darby and Pickup, 2019, p. 9)
According to Darby and Pickup’s account, a proposition is determinately
true when it is not false at any situation that is a candidate for representing
actuality and true in at least one.21 In contrast, a proposition is indeterminate
when there are at least two situations that are candidates for representing
actuality, and the proposition is true at one of them and false at the other.
Again, an example helps us to understand better how the machinery works.
Let us suppose that it is metaphysically indeterminate whether Alice is playing
with her dog. In the set of situations which do not determinately misrepresent
the actual world, there will be many situations that do not say anything about
Alice; in respect of these situations, the proposition ‘Alice is playing with her
dog’ simply lacks any truth-value. All the other situations will be of two kinds.
Some situations which are candidates for representing reality make true that
Alice is playing with her dog; however, the same proposition will be false at
other situations which are candidates for representing actuality. Given that
the situations in which the proposition is true are candidates for representing
actuality as good as those in which the proposition is false, it is metaphysically
20 Note cursorily that, although the situations that are candidates for representing actuality
may disagree with each other, they lack any contradiction in themselves. Indeed, no situation
verifies p and ¬p at the same time.
21 And conversely it is determinately false when it is not true at any situation that is a
candidate for representing actuality and false in at least one.
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indeterminate whether Alice is playing with her dog in the actual world.22
Let us turn now to how they deal with quantum superposition. They consider
the well-known example of Schrödinger’s cat: a cat is closed in a diabolic box
that contains a device that releases a poisonous gas if an atom of isotope
uranium decays. If the atom decays, the cat drops dead; if it does not decay,
the cat survives. According to quantum mechanics, the system evolves in a way
that, after a certain time, the atom will be in a superposition of being decayed
and being not; since the atom and the cat compose a bigger system, the upshot
of the thought experiment is that also the cat ends up in a superposition of
being alive and dead. How can we make sense of such indeterminacy? This is
Darby and Pickup’s proposal, which I quote at length:
Our model can deal with this case in a natural way. Consider the
following three situations, each of which is a candidate for representing
actuality: s1, a situation in which the cat is alive, s2, a situation in which
the cat is dead, and s3, the fusion of s1 and s2. In s1, it is true that the
cat is alive and false that it is dead. In s2 it is true that the cat is dead
and false that it is alive. So, what status do these propositions have?
According to our definition, they are indeterminate, because there is a
situation which is a candidate for representing actuality in which they
are true and another situation which is a candidate for representing
actuality in which they are false. What is the case in s3? It seems s3
is overdetermined with respect to the cat’s mortality, as parts of s3
disagree about whether the cat is alive. Specifically, s2 precludes the
proposition that the cat is alive and s1 precludes the proposition that
the cat is dead. So, following our argument above, the proposition that
the cat is alive is neither true nor false in s3 (as is the proposition
that the cat is dead). The indeterminacy involved in superposition is
therefore dealt with. (2019, p. 16)
One of the crucial aspects of their account that emerges in the quotation
is the following: if two contradictory propositions (e.g. p and ¬p) are going to
be verified in the same situation, then they both lack a truth-value at that sit-
uation. Such a detail is crucial for avoiding the Kochen-Specker result. Recall
why Barnes and Williams’ account fails with quantum indeterminacy: since
they use complete possible worlds that do not contain any indeterminacy in
themselves, they must attribute definite values to all of a quantum system’s
properties at the same time. Darby and Pickup’s account instead, successfully
manages to avoid such a contradiction. Indeed, they argue that different situa-
tions describe different properties of the system but, crucially, no incompatible
properties will receive a definite value in the same situation. Insofar as a situa-
tion might be silent on some aspect of reality, there is no need to assign definite
22 Darby and Pickup’s account is much richer and articulated than my brief summary.
Indeed, they do present some details that, since they are not crucial here, I have skipped.
Moreover, they present and discuss some alternatives to their account. Since they do ac-
knowledge explicitly why the variants of their situations account fails, I will stick to the
main account only.
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values to all the properties of a quantum system. Using disagreeing situations,
and avoiding any contradiction arising from assigning values to incompatible
properties in the same situations, their machinery of situations accounts for
quantum indeterminacy.
4 A Situation in Which Situation Semantics Fails
Albeit prima facie Darby and Pickup’s account seems to accommodate cases
of quantum indeterminacy, I argue now that it is not the case.
Let us start by assuming that in the actual world an electron is in the state:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉z + |↓〉z) (2)
Note that according to the formalism of quantum mechanics, state (2) is math-
ematically equivalent to:
|ψ〉 = |↑〉x (3)
Indeed, being in a superposition on the z-axis means having a definite value for
the x component of spin.23 Note that this implies that being in spin up along
the x-axis means being in a superposition of the z-axis; in other terms, |↑〉x
and 1√
2
(|↑〉z + |↓〉z are mathematically equivalent ways of describing the same
vector (i.e. the vector is represented in different bases of the Hilbert space).
Darby and Pickup’s account deals with superposition in the following way:
when a system is superposed on an axis, there is a situation in which the
system has spin up, and a situation at which it has spin down. Therefore, if in
the real world our electron is in state |ψ〉, then there are at least two situations
that are candidates for representing actuality:24 at s1 the particle has spin-up
along the z-axis and at s2 it has spin-down along the z-axis. Darby and Pickup
propose to capture the two properties that the electron could have through a
couple of propositions. The proposition expressing the fact that the electron
has spin up is true at the first situation and false at the second; the opposite
is true for the proposition expressing the property of having spin down along
the z-axis. Albeit they do not specify what such a proposition is, I propose to
consider the following:
(pz+) The system is in a state that is an eigenvector of the operator σz with a
corresponding eigenvalue +1.25
23 To be more specific, it depends on how one labels the vectors in the Hilbert space used
for representing spin states. What is true is that being in a superposition of an axis means
being in a state that is an eigenvector of some operator that represents the property of having
spin along another axis. We assume that the vectors that are equal to a superposition of the
z component of spin with expansion coefficients 1√
2
are spin up and spin down along the
x-axis.
24 Note that there is also a third situation that is a fusion of s1 and s2, at which the truth
value of the propositions that capture the particle having spin up and spin down along the
z-axis both lack a truth value.
25 I considered, as is common in the literature on quantum mechanics, having spin up
(down) and having eigenvalue (-)+1 the same property.
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This proposition, which captures the fact that the system has spin up along
the z-axis, is true at s1, and false at s2 since it makes true a different propo-
sition that entails the falsehood of (pz+).
26 Note that (pz+) is also false when
the system is in a superposed state like (1).27 Indeed, a superposed state of
eigenvectors is not itself an eigenvector of its corresponding operator. That
is to say that a superposition of the eigenvectors (with different eigenvalues)
of the operator σz, is not itself an eigenvector of σz (but crucially, it will be
an eigenvector of some other operator; in the case at hand, of σx when the
expansion coefficients of the superposition are 1√
2
).
Let us focus now on their criteria of ‘candidate for representing actuality’. A
situation is a candidate for representing actuality if it does not determinately
misrepresent the actual world. An example is the situation s3 that they explic-
itly accept, i.e. the situation that should verify both s1 and s2. In this situation,
(pz+) and (pz−) both lack a truth value. However, given the definition of ‘can-
didate for representing actuality,’ we can find many other situations concerning
our electron that Darby and Pickup do not consider. Take the proposition:
(px+) The system is in a state that is an eigenvector of the operator σx with a
corresponding eigenvalue +1,
There will be a situation (s4) candidate for actuality which makes true only
(px+).
At this stage of the argument, I am going to endorse the following principle,
which I dub the principle of ‘equivalent candidates for representing actuality’
(ECA henceforth):
(ECA) Consider a situation s1 that is a candidate for representing actuality and
verifies only a proposition p1 which contains a mathematical object o1.
Any other situation s2 that differs from s1 only in that it makes true a
proposition p2 which is obtained by simply replacing o1 with o2, where the
latter is a mathematical object equivalent to the former (i.e. o1 = o2), is
also a candidate for representing actuality.
Such a principle seems to be intuitively reasonable. Let us see how it works
by presenting a toy example. Suppose it is metaphysically indeterminate how
many oranges there are in the fridge; assume further that there might just be
either three or four. According to Darby and Pickup’s view, there is a possible
situation in which there are three oranges, and a possible situation in which
there are four, but neither describes correctly nor misrepresents the actual
world (and therefore the propositions ‘there are three oranges in the fridge’
26 The situation s2 makes true only the proposition (pz− ): ‘The system is in a state that is
an eigenvector of the operator σz with a corresponding eigenvalue -1’. Given some semantic
assumptions held by Darby and Pickup and some rules of linear algebra, the truth of (pz− )
entails the falsehood of (pz+ ), and vice versa.
27 On the contrary, in Darby and Pickup’s account a proposition like ‘The system has
spin up along the z-axis’ would lack a truth-value in the situations in which the system is
superposed. As it will be clear later on, distinguishing propositions that express a mathe-
matical description of reality from those expressing a metaphysical one is crucial to run the
argument against Darby and Pickup’s view.
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and ‘there are four oranges in the fridge’ are indeterminate, being true and
false in at least one situation). The principle (ECA) simply guarantees that if
the possible situation in which there are three oranges is a candidate for rep-
resenting actuality, then also the situations that verify respectively only the
propositions ‘there are two plus one oranges in the fridge’ or ‘there are four
minus one oranges in the fridge’, and so on, are candidates for representing ac-
tuality. All of this might seem superfluous, but it is not. In everyday examples
like the one above, there will usually be a unique situation that makes true
every mathematically equivalent proposition. However, it is better to assume
that it is not the case for quantum phenomena. Darby and Pickup (2019, p.
11) explicitly say that a situation that verifies a proposition concerning, say,
spin along the x-axis may not verify any proposition concerning spin along a
different direction. To avoid begging the question against their view, I assume
that there are different situations that make true (or false) propositions con-
cerning spin in different directions.28
Coming back to quantum indeterminacy, we have seen that the state spin up
along the x-axis is mathematically equivalent to being in a superposition of
spin up and down along the z-axis. That is, they are the very same state from
a mathematical point of view.29 The same can be said of the latter states, i.e.
being in spin up and down along the z-axis means being in a superposition of








(|↑〉x − |↓〉x) (5)
Give (ECA), if a situation that is a candidate for representing actuality makes
true a proposition that captures the fact that the system is in state spin up
(down) along the z-axis, then also the situation that verifies a proposition
describing the system in a superposed state of spin up plus (minus) spin down
the x-axis must be a candidate for representing actuality.
To sum up, when a system in the actual world is in state spin up along the
x-axis, and thus in a superposition of spin along the z-axis, there are three




s3: {pz+ , pz−}
28 Mainly because Darby and Pickup (2019, p.11) explicitly acknowledge that this feature
of situation semantic is crucial to avoid arguments based on the Kochen-Specker theorem.
Moreover, note that the argument that follows could be restated, in a slightly different form,
even granting that there is a unique situation that verifies every proposition concerning the
mathematically equivalent representation of spin. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing
me on this point.
29 This is due to the properties of the complex vector space in which states of spin live in.
What said so far can be showed formally, even though there is no need to do it here.
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where ‘sn: {p1 . . . pn}’ is a shorthand for ‘situation sn verifies propositions p1
. . . pn.’
Nevertheless, there are other situations that are candidates for representing
actuality. The first one expresses the fact that the system is in state (2),
namely, situation s4 which makes true only (px+). Given (ECA), if a situation
that verifies only a proposition that describes the state of the system as having
spin up (down) along the z-axis is a candidate for representing actuality, it
follows that a situation that makes true only a description of the system as
being in a superposition of spin along the x-axis also must be a candidate for
representing actuality. Let us capture this fact with the following propositions:
(sp+x ) The system is in a superposed state of being spin up plus spin down along
the x-axis.
(sp−x ) The system is in a superposed state of being spin up minus spin down along
the x-axis.
According to (ECA) then, there must be two situations, s5 and s6, that verify,




Therefore, the list of the possible situations that are candidates for represent-
ing actuality is the following:
s1: {pz+}
s2: {pz−}




Now my argument against Darby and Pickup can be easily stated. Recall again
(px+): the system is in a state that is an eigenvector of the operator σx with
a corresponding eigenvalue +1. Such a proposition seems to be determinately
true, insofar as one of the premises of the whole argument is that, in the ac-
tual concrete world, our electron is in a state (1). According to the Darby and
Pickup model, a proposition is determinately true if it is true in at least one
situation (candidate for representing actuality) but false in no other situation.
However, when we evaluate (px+) according to Darby and Pickup’s account,
it turns out to be metaphysically indeterminate. Indeed, it is true at s4, but
30 One may wonder why this is not enough to show that Darby and Pickup’s account fails
to model quantum phenomena. If the model considers as candidates for actuality situations
that make true propositions like (sp+x ) and (sp
−
x ), then it clearly fails. Since the first as-
sumption has been that the system in the actual world has a determinate state of spin,
these propositions – or so the thought goes – determinately misrepresent the actual world.
This argument has some mordent, especially because situations are concrete parts of the
actual world, rather than ersatz. That being said, an assumption of their argument is that
an indeterminate state of affair is not misrepresented by a determinate one. If one charitably
assumes that the logic underlying Darby and Pickup’s approach is similar to that of Barnes
and Williams (2011), then also the converse should hold. That is, an indeterminate state of
affairs does not determinately misrepresent a determinate one. I come back on this later on
(section 5), when I discuss how one could resist the idea that s5 and s6 are candidates for
actuality. I thank an anonymous referee for a discussion on this point.
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falsified by s5 and s6. When a system is in a superposed state, then necessarily
its state is not an eigenstate of the corresponding operator, whose eigenvectors
(belonging to different eigenvalues, as in the present context) are the terms
of the superposition. Given that it is not metaphysically indeterminate in the
actual world if the system is in state spin up along the x-axis, Darby and
Pickup’s approach wrongly accounts this case as metaphysically indetermi-
nate. It follows that Darby and Pickup’s account is not reliable for modelling
quantum indeterminacy.
5 Is the argument conclusive?
The argument proposed hinges on some assumptions that might be resisted.
In what follows, I will briefly discuss some ways of doing so. The conclusion of
this section is that, in the best-case scenario, blocking my argument commits
one to claims that are unlikely to be willingly endorsed by friends of MI.
Excluding the assumptions of Darby and Pickup’s view, my argument hinges
on three main points; it goes without saying that the most straightforward way
of resisting it is that of challenging them. These three additions to Darby and
Pickup’s account are: (i) the admissibility of s4 as a candidate for representing
actuality, (ii) the claim that (px+) is false in s5 and s6, and (iii) the admissibility
of s5 and s6 as candidates for representing actuality.
(i) The admissibility of s4: A first way of blocking the argument above is to
deny that the situation in which the system has a definite spin up along the
x-axis, i.e. s4, might be a candidate for representing actuality. The reasoning
would be something along the following lines: when there is MI, one has to
consider only those situations that deal with MI. Therefore, since the spin
along the x-axis is determined, the only relevant situations are those that deal
with the z spin. Such an argument would be not only highly counter-intuitive
but it would betray the whole spirit of situation semantics. Indeed, Darby and
Pickup’s account is supposed to differentiate metaphysically determined and
indeterminate states of affairs. Therefore, if in the actual world it is determi-
nately the case that p obtains, then there must be a situation at which p is
true. From this, it follows that, insofar as in our example the system determi-
nately has spin up along the x-axis, the proposition (px+) must be true at least
at a situation that is a candidate for representing actuality. Therefore, since
s4 verifies only (px+) and does not misrepresent reality in any other regards,
it must be a candidate for representing actuality.31 If it were not, indeed, the
situation semantics proposed by Darby and Pickup would be unable to ac-
count for the fact that, in the actual world, it is determinately the case that
the electron has spin up along the x-axis.
31 The fact that (px+ ) must be true at some situation is more than enough; indeed even if
one successfully denies the admissibility of s4 (for example claiming ad hoc that a situation
must verify more than a proposition), there must be nonetheless a situation that makes true
(px+ ). In that case, it is trivial to substitute to my s4 that situation, and run the argument
with it.
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(ii) The truth value of (px+) in s5 and s6: An alternative way to resist my
argument would be to insist that (px+) is neither true nor false at s5 and s6.
Indeed, one might want to argue that, when the system is in a superposed
state, it is neither true nor false that it has the property of having spin up (or
down) along the relevant axis. Insofar as (px+) is supposed to capture such
a property, then it should be neither true nor false at s5 and s6. Indeed, one
might claim, such a reply is really natural because it makes (px+) determinately
true,32 as it should. Now, such a reply hinges on an ambiguity between the
mathematical description of the state of a system and the property that the
physical system instantiates. I address such an ambiguity in the final part of
the next paragraph; the considerations that I make there elucidate why I take
(px+) to be falsified by s5 and s6. Before turning to that, I think it is worth
it to point out that, even granting that (px+) is neither true nor false at s5
and s6, my argument still points out two main worries about the Darby and
Pickup account.
Firstly, it seems that if (px+) is neither true nor false at s5 and s6, then
these situations include a metaphysically indeterminate state of affairs, i.e.
the electron being in a superposition of being spin up and down. How can
we understand such indeterminacy? Following Darby and Pickup’s account,
these situations should be made each of two other situations, one at which
the system has spin up along the x-axis and one at which it has spin down.
Such an understanding is suspicious for many reasons. On the one hand, the
situation at which the system has spin down along the x-axis does not seem
admissible, insofar as it determinately misrepresents the actual world. On the
other, such a move will open an infinite regression of precisifications, which
doubtfully helps us understand quantum indeterminacy.33
Another difficulty is the following. Even granting that (px+) is neither true
nor false at s5 and s6, it still remains that, in their account, a determinate
state of affairs in the actual world is understood as worldly indecision, so to
speak, between different possible indeterminate states of affairs. The upshot
of my argument is that they are committed to the view that when a system
has determinately spin up along the x-axis, the world is unsettled between
a superposition of spin up plus spin down along the x-axis (the situation
s5) and a superposition of spin up minus spin down along the x-axis (the
situation s6). When the system is superposed, it might make intuitive sense to
claim that the world is unsettled between two definite possibilities. However,
claiming that a determinate state can be understood as worldly indecision
between indeterminate states seems plainly odd and obscure. Even if it is not
a knockdown argument, I claim that a view with such a consequence is highly
unappealing. In order to avoid these worries, rather than accepting that (px+)
is neither true nor false at s5 and s6 it is more likely that friends of Darby and
32 Since it would be verified by at least a situation, namely s4, and falsified by no other.
33 Such a consequence has been pointed out for other meta-level accounts as well by Calosi
and Wilson (2018, p. 2615). One way of resisting it is denying the possibility of represent-
ing higher-order vagueness; but since representing higher-order vagueness is a feature that
friends of meta-level approach would not give up, I will not consider such a reply further.
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Pickup’s account would be tempted to deny s5 and s6 as admissible candidates
for representing actuality. We finally turn to this kind of reply.
(iii) The admissibility of s5 and s6: There are three main ways of challenging
the admissibility of s5 and s6 as candidates for representing actuality.
The first way consists of claiming that s5 and s6 are not possible because they
determinately misrepresent the actual world: since the system is in a determi-
nate state of spin along the x-axis, being in a superposed state determinately
misrepresents the actual world. Note that if this were the case, then the con-
verse should also hold: if a system is superposed in reality, then a determinate
state misrepresents it. Consequently, Darby and Pickup’s account would in-
stantly fail, insofar as accounting superposition as worldly indecision between
spin up and spin down is the core of their explanation. In other words, if a
superposed state along the x-axis misrepresents the actual world, given its
mathematical equivalence with being spin up (down) along the z-axis, then
there would no longer be any reason to claim that s2 and s3 are candidates
for representing actuality. Such a reply would make my argument invalid, but
at the prize of rejecting the Darby and Pickup account. Moreover, this move
would be in opposition to the very way in which meta-level approaches see
quantum indeterminacy. Indeed, according to these accounts of MI, when a
system is superposed between spin up and down along an axis, the spin of the
system is metaphysically indeterminate. Such indeterminacy is understood as
it is not determinately the case that the system has spin up and it is not
determinately the case that the system has not spin up (Darby, 2010).34 If
this is the way in which defenders of meta-level accounts understand quan-
tum indeterminacy, claiming that the proposition (pα) ‘it is determinately the
case that the system is in state spin up along the α axis’ misrepresents a su-
perposed state begs the question against their approach to MI. According to
them indeed, when a system is in a superposed state, its logical description is
‘¬∆pα ∧ ¬∆¬pα, where ‘α’ is any axis and ‘∆’ is the determinacy operator
that must be read as ‘it is determinate that’.35 A proposition that captures
such a logical structure is not determinately misrepresented, nor determinately
misrepresents, states of affairs captured by ‘∆pα’ and ‘∆¬pα’.
A second way to deny the admissibility of s5 and s6 as candidates for repre-
senting actuality is that of directly rejecting the validity of (ECA). I think
that such a move would make Darby and Pickup’s account highly unappeal-
ing; indeed, what can possibly be the justification for rejecting (ECA)? I see
why, in epistemic evaluations, for instance, the sobstitutio salva veritate might
fail. For example, if Bob does not know that Alice’s dog is named ‘Nala’,
then the proposition ‘Bob knows that Alice is playing with her dog’ might be
34 Note that a big assumption of their approach is that having spin down is equal to the
negation of ‘having spin up’. I think that such an assumption could be challenged, especially
for observables with continuous values (such as position and momentum), albeit I will not
do that here.
35 See Fine (1975) for one way of introducing such a modal operator and Darby (2010) for
the application to quantum cases.
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true at the same time that ‘Bob knows that Alice is playing with Nala’ being
false. Nevertheless, in the case at hand, we are dealing with mathematically
equivalent descriptions of the very same state, and we are concerned with the
metaphysical descriptions. In other words, we are dealing with a de re reading
of the propositions: we are talking about the referents of the terms involved,
rather than the terms themselves. And in a de re reading, ‘Bob knows that
Alice is playing with her dog’ and ‘Bob knows that Alice is playing with Nala’
are also equally true. Therefore, I do not see how one can argue that a situa-
tion that verifies ‘the system is in state spin up along the z-axis’ might be a
candidate for representing actuality, and one that makes true ‘the system is
in a superposition of spin up and down along the x-axis’ could not: spin up
along the z-axis describes the same state of ‘being in a superposition along
the x-axis’. Moreover, denying the equivalence leaves space for rejecting the
very first assumption of my argument, i.e. that a system with a definite spin
along the x-axis is in a superposed state along the z-axis. Since such a fact is a
well-established experimental result, I take every view that allows its rejection
as at least suspicious.
I turn now to the last way of resisting my argument, which shows that I may
have left room for ambiguities in the formulation of my argument. Such a con-
sideration helps to develop a stronger version of the argument, in that I think
it highlights what is – generally speaking – suspicious about using meta-level
accounts of MI to explain quantum indeterminacy. One might want to point
out that the situations used by Darby and Pickup are incomplete but defi-
nite, that is to say, they do not contain in themselves any indeterminacy of
the sort. Such a claim might be used, once again, for undermining my claim
that s5 and s6 are admissible situations: insofar as these propositions describe
indeterminate states of affairs, they cannot be verified by a situation that is a
candidate for representing actuality. Moreover, one might object that, insofar
as Darby and Pickup explicitly claim that their situations are incomplete but
definite, I have misunderstood their account all along. Such a reply, however,
hinges on the ambiguity mentioned earlier, to which we now turn. The ambi-
guity lies between propositions that refer to the mathematical description of
the quantum state and propositions that describe the properties instantiated
by the quantum objects. Consider the following propositions:
(px+) The system is in a state that is an eigenvector of the operator σx with a
corresponding eigenvalue +1.
(su) The electron has the property of having spin up along the x-axis.
Propositions (px+) and (su) should be, given the eigenvalue-eigenstate link,
equivalent; indeed, (EEL) implies that they should always have the same truth
value. The very core of (EEL) is exactly that of connecting the mathematical
description of a quantum system to its metaphysical one, i.e. which properties
it instantiates. Nonetheless, according to meta-level approaches, these descrip-
tions are not equivalent. Reasonably indeed, when the latter is metaphysically
indeterminate (for example when the system is in a superposition of spin along
the x-axis), the former is determinately false: when a system is in a superposed
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state of spin, even conceding that the proposition that captures the fact that
the system has spin up (or spin down) is indeterminate, the proposition that
says that the state of the system is mathematically describable as an eigenvec-
tor of the corresponding operator is determinately false. In fact, propositions
that refer to the mathematical description of the state of the system are never
indeterminate: when the electron is in a state of superposition of its spin along
the x-axis, the proposition ‘the electron is in state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉x ± |↓〉x)’ is
always determinately true. What is indeterminate is whether, when the system
is in such a state, it instantiates the property of having spin up (down). I think
that meta-level approaches are committed to accepting that propositions that
describe the mathematical state of the system might be indeterminate; as I
have done throughout the whole paper, I stick only to Darby and Pickup’s
account in what follows.36
So, I would concede that accepting that s5 and s6 as admissible might be sus-
pected of begging the question against Darby and Pickup’s view: the core of
their account is exactly that such an indeterminate instantiation of properties
must be captured by a disagreement of possible situations; and therefore, a
situation cannot contain indeterminate states of affairs. Nevertheless, this is
of no help for the friends of their account because they must concede that the
following proposition:
(iz) The electron is in a state that is not an eigenvector of the operator σz;
rather, the system is in a state that might be expressed as a linear com-
bination of the eigenvectors of σz with respective eigenvalues of +1 and
-1,
which is determinately true or false, might be verified by a situation that is a
candidate for actuality. If this is so, the argument becomes even stronger than
before: in the actual world the system is in a definite state of spin along the
x-axis, and so it is in a superposition of spin along the z-axis. That is to say,
(iz) should be determinately true. Recall that in this case, Darby and Pickup
say that there are two possible situations that are candidates for representing
actuality, one that makes true that the system has spin up along z (s7), and
another that verifies that the system has spin down (s8).
37 If s7 and s8 are
candidates for representing actuality, then, given (EEL) and (ECA), I should
be free to admit as candidates for representing actuality those situations that
make true the mathematical descriptions of having spin up and down along
the z-axis, that is to say, s1 and s2. However, this implies a contradiction again.
In the actual world the system is in a superposition of spin along the z-axis;
therefore, (iz) should be determinately true. Given the truth of (iz), it should
36 A way out might be that of giving up the (EEL) for a different version of the link. The
viability of such a move and the possibility of generalizing such a claim to all meta-level
approaches are the subject of a current project.
37 Situation s7 makes true only the proposition ‘the system has spin up along the z-
axis’, and s8 verifies only the proposition ‘the system has spin up along the z-axis’. To
be as charitable as possible, I assumed they are different from s1 and s2, insofar as (pz+ )
and (pz− ) are different propositions from those verified by s7 and s8. Given (EEL), these
propositions are equivalent.
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follow that both (pz+) and (pz−) are determinately false.
38 These propositions
should be determinately false because in the actual world the system is not
in a state that is an eigenstate of the operator σz. Therefore, they should not
be true at any possible situation (but false in at least one). According to the
Darby and Pickup account though, they turn out to be indeterminate, insofar
as (pz+) is made true by s1 and falsified by s2, where (pz−) is false at the
former situation and true at the latter. By the same token, (iz) also receives
a wrong truth-value. Whereas in the actual world it should be determinately
true, it turns out to be false, insofar as it is false at both s1 and s2, and it is
not verified by any situation that is a candidate for representing actuality.39
The only way, that I see at least, for resisting this last conclusion is to accept
that propositions like (pz+), (pz−) and (iz) might have an indeterminate truth
value. But this amounts to accepting that the mathematical description of the
quantum state (i.e. the mathematical description of the properties instanti-
ated by quantum objects) is unreliable for drawing metaphysical conclusions.
Indeed, such a claim would amount to either (a) the claim that, when a system
is in a superposed state, then it is indeterminate which eigenvector represents
the state (and so (pz+) and (pz−) have an indeterminate truth value),
40 or (b)
a rejection of the eigenvalue-eigenstate link. Alas, these claims are worrisome
for the friends of MI. (a) is dangerously close to an epistemic understanding of
the formalism of quantum mechanics. As a matter of fact, the claim that math-
ematical descriptions do not tell us the exact properties of quantum systems
has been considered the hallmark of epistemic interpretations of the quantum
states. I would be happy to concede that such a view is the right one if forced
by conclusions drawn by the formalism of quantum mechanics, established ex-
periments or mathematical theorems. Nonetheless, if a view of MI would force
me to accept such a position on the quantum states, I would rather move to
another account of MI. And the reason for that is soon explained: examples of
MI arising in quantum mechanics are drawn precisely by taking the formalism
at face value. A metaphysical account that accepts that the quantum states do
not describe the properties of a quantum system correctly undermines, from
38 Provided some semantic assumption according to which, ¬p being true entails p being
false, and vice versa. Insofar as (Darby and Pickup, 2019, p.11) endorse these assumptions,
I did assume them unproblematically.
39 Even if they would find a situation at which it is true, according to their account it would
still turn out to be indeterminate, rather than determinately true as it should; indeed, the
fact that (iz) is false at s1 and s2 excludes the possibility of it being determinately true.
40 In other words, that we use superposed states to represent the fact that the system
always is either in one eigenvector or in the other. The only way to make sense of this claim
is to read it epistemically: we use superposition to represent the fact that an electron, say,
has either spin up or spin down at all the times, but we ignore in which state the electron is
until we measure it. Friends of MI are, as we have seen in section 2, committed to some form
of ontic understanding of the quantum state. Therefore, showing that this way of resisting
my argument commits one to an epistemic reading of the quantum state is more than enough
to rule it out (as a possible counterargument available to the friends of Darby and Pickup’s
account).
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the beginning, the very reason for looking for quantum MI.41 The same hap-
pens with (b) since, as we have seen, (EEL) is the principle that justifies the
claim that there is quantum MI in the first place. An account that accepts
either (a) or (b) (or both), rejects beforehand the very idea that quantum
mechanics presents metaphysically indeterminate states of affairs. As such, it
is not something that an account of MI should embrace.
6 Conclusion
Under some controversial assumptions, it is possible to argue that non-relativistic
quantum mechanics offers a genuine example of metaphysical indeterminacy.
As we have seen, given that there are two main approaches to MI in the liter-
ature, many philosophers try to test their compatibility with quantum cases.
Since the fall of the champion of meta-level approaches proposed by Barnes
and Williams, many have tried to develop alternative supervaluationist theo-
ries able to cash out quantum indeterminacy.
In the paper, I have argued that the last of these proposals, namely Darby
and Pickup (2017)’s view, fails in the context of quantum mechanics. In this
theory, the mathematical description of a state of definite spin along an axis
is mathematically equivalent to the description of being in a superposition on
another axis. I showed that, when one considers some propositions concern-
ing the mathematical description of a quantum system, Darby and Pickup’s
account assigns them a wrong truth-value. Moreover, I argued that the most
straightforward ways of resisting my argument imply a rejection of one of the
assumption needed to claim that there is quantum indeterminacy in the first
place. As with Barnes and Williams’ view, showing that there is at least one
quantum case in which their account fails is more than enough to inspire doubt
concerning its tenability in the quantum arena.
I have taken Darby and Pickup’s account as an example. But such an example
is interesting because it hints at the fact that there might be a reason why
their account, as well as that proposed by Barnes and Williams previously,
fails. And such a reason I think lies at the heart of meta-level approaches and
the irremediable incompatibility of their core tenet with quantum mechanics.
The interesting question then would be whether it is possible to generalize my
argument to any other meta-level account of MI. If such a generalization is
possible, this would mean that object-level accounts should be the preferred
tool for understanding MI (which in turns would imply the question ‘Which
object-level account, if any, deals with quantum indeterminacy?’). My intuition
41 A possible way out would be to endorse a radical view according to which the truth-
values of mathematical descriptions are ruled by quantum logic. Since it is commonly as-
sumed that the meta-language of the mathematical formalism of a physical theory is classi-
cal logic (or intuitionistic, at best), I do not consider such a possibility further. However, it
would be interesting to see whether there are arguments in favour of the adoption of such
a meta-logical framework for the quantum formalism that are independent of one’s account
of MI. I thank an anonymous referee for bringing up this interesting point.
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is that such a generalization of my argument is possible.42 The (EEL) tightly
links the mathematical and the metaphysical description. Since meta-level ap-
proaches treat MI as an indeterminacy of the truth value of the propositions
describing it, and (EEL) bridges these propositions in natural language to the
mathematical ones, friends of meta-level accounts seem to be committed to the
idea that also the mathematical description of quantum states might be inde-
terminate. Accepting that the mathematical description of quantum systems
is not precise (i.e. we cannot take it at face value) seems dangerously close
to forms of ψ-epistemic understanding of quantum formalism. As a matter of
fact, a ψ-epistemic reading of the quantum state is clearly incompatible with
quantum MI. Indeed, the very first reason for looking at quantum MI was that
of taking quantum formalism at face value.
I think that trying to generalize the argument here proposed is essential. Given
the popularity of meta-level approaches, one way of stopping the industry of
introducing ad hoc modifications to Barnes and Williams’ account is that of
showing once and for all that as long as one is willing to take quantum states as
real, he/she must admit that quantum indeterminacy is not worldly indecision.
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